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 NOTE 
Missouri’s School Transfer Law: Not a 
Hancock Violation but a Mere Bandage on 
Wounded Districts 
Breitenfeld v. School District of Clayton, 399 S.W.3d 816 (Mo. 2013) (en banc) 
KIMBERLY HUBBARD* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In December of 2013, three school districts in Missouri were unaccred-
ited: Kansas City Public Schools, the Normandy School District, and the 
Riverview Gardens School District.1  As of August 2014,2 the Saint Louis 
Public School District (“SLPS”) had provisional accreditation.3  SLPS is the 
district involved in the litigation that is the subject of this Note.  Ten other 
Missouri school districts also had provisional accreditation in July of 2013.4 
 
* B.A. Political Science, University of Missouri, 2012; J.D. Candidate, University of 
Missouri School of Law, 2015.  I am grateful to Professor Brad Desnoyer for his 
suggestions and guidance during the writing of this Note and throughout my law 
school experience.  I would also like to thank my dear friend Abby Schneider for her 
help with the title of this Note.  And last, but most certainly not least, special thanks 
to my family and significant other who love and support me in all of my endeavors. 
 1. See Barbara Shelly, Op-Ed., Missouri School Chief Chris Nicastro: KC 
Schools Recommendation About Integrity, KAN. CITY STAR (Sept. 28, 2013, 5:21 
PM), http://www.kansascity.com/2013/09/26/4510621/missouri-education-commiss-
ioner.html. 
 2. The accreditation status of districts is constantly changing, and the transfer 
statute has been the subject of ongoing debate; therefore, the information in this Note 
is accurate as of August 2014, but may no longer reflect current accreditation status or 
current Missouri law. 
 3. Dale Singer, Op-Ed., Should Entire School Districts or Just Individual 
Schools Be Accredited?, ST. LOUIS BEACON (July 29, 2013, 12:14 AM), https://www.
stlbeacon.org/#!/content/32084/individual_school_accreditation_072613. 
 4. Id.  Public schools in Missouri are given the status of unaccredited, accredit-
ed, or provisional accreditation based on fourteen performance standards.  Jessica 
Bock, State Board Gives Provisional Accreditation for St. Louis Public Schools, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Oct. 16, 2012, 11:45 AM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/
local/education/state-board-gives-provisional-accreditation-for-st-louis-public-
schools/article_27dc696e-596a-5c4f-a5ad-e5c8d224971f.html.  A district is given full 
accreditation by meeting at least nine standards. Id.  Meeting only five or fewer 
standards “can mean unaccredited status.” Id.  Meeting any number of performance 
standards between five and nine earns a district provisional accreditation.  See id. 
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There is a law in Missouri – Missouri Revised Statutes Section 167.131 
– that allows students from an unaccredited school district to transfer to an 
accredited school district, while having their tuition and transportation costs 
paid for by the unaccredited school district.5  Students transferring from un-
accredited to accredited school districts pursuant to the transfer statute may 
be rewarded with a better educational experience in the accredited district; 
however, there are many injurious consequences of the statute.  These conse-
quences negatively affect students who have used or will use the transfer 
statute to transfer districts,6 accredited districts that receive transfer students,7 
the accreditation system that is used to assess Missouri school districts’ per-
formance,8 and, most of all, unaccredited districts that lose students because 
of the transfer law.9 
In Breitenfeld v. School District of Clayton, a parent of students residing 
in the SLPS District brought suit to enforce the transfer law so that her chil-
dren could attend the neighboring accredited Clayton School District (“Clay-
ton”) using tuition paid for by SLPS.10  Both SLPS and Clayton argued a 
defense to the enforceability of the law on the theory of impossibility – that it 
would be “impossible” for the districts to comply with the law because Clay-
ton could not provide the necessary resources for the transfer students and 
SLPS could not afford to pay the tuition costs for transfer students.11  Tax-
payers from both SLPS and Clayton intervened to argue that the statute creat-
ed an unfunded mandate in violation of the Hancock Amendment of the Mis-
souri Constitution.12  The court upheld the law, rejecting the defense of im-
possibility and holding that the law did not violate the Hancock Amend-
ment.13 
This Note first discusses the Breitenfeld decision and then explores the 
prior cases and legislation leading up to the Breitenfeld decision.  In discuss-
ing Breitenfeld, this Note describes how the transfer law will affect trans-
ferred students, unaccredited districts forced to pay tuition, accredited dis-
tricts forced to accept transfer students, and the public school accreditation 
system in Missouri.  Finally, this Note proposes that because the adverse con-
sequences outweigh the benefits of the law, action must be taken so that un-
accredited school districts can have a fighting chance to become accredited 
again.  Legislative change is necessary because a solution is not forthcoming 
from the Supreme Court of Missouri, as the court recently affirmed its 
Breitenfeld holding in Blue Springs R-IV School District v. School District of 
 
 5. MO. REV. STAT. § 167.131 (2012).  This statute will hereinafter be referred to 
as “the transfer statute” or “Section 167.131.” 
 6. See infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text. 
 7. See infra notes 117-125 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra notes 126-130 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra notes 107-116 and accompanying text. 
 10. 399 S.W.3d 816, 822 (Mo. 2013) (en banc). 
 11. Id. at 822-23. 
 12. Id. at 821-22 (citing MO. CONST. art. X, §§ 16-24). 
 13. Id. at 834, 836. 
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Kansas City.14  This ruling confirms that attempting to solve the problems the 
transfer law causes by challenging the law under the Hancock Amendment 
will be unsuccessful.15  Proposed in this Note are two other possible options: 
that lawmakers amend or repeal the law or that administrators change the 
Missouri accreditation system. 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
SLPS16 became unaccredited in 2007.17  The plaintiff, Gina Breiten-
feld,18 and her two children resided in the SLPS district, but the children had 
never attended SLPS schools.19  For the duration of the Breitenfeld children’s 
education, they attended private schools.20  However, Breitenfeld enrolled her 
children in Clayton for the 2007-2008 school year pursuant to a tuition 
agreement between herself and Clayton.21  After SLPS became unaccredited, 
Breitenfeld sought payment of tuition by SLPS to Clayton under the transfer 
law for educating her children during the 2009-2012 school years.22  The 
Breitenfelds lived in Clayton for a portion of the time period between 2009 
and 2012; however, they resided in the SLPS District for a portion of that 
time period as well and still owed Clayton tuition for the 2009-2012 school 
years.23  When SLPS and Clayton refused to fulfill the obligations under Sec-
tion 167.131, Breitenfeld initiated this litigation.24 
SLPS and Clayton objected to the enforcement of the transfer statute, 
and Clayton counterclaimed against Breitenfeld for the payment of tuition 
 
 14. 415 S.W.3d 110, 111 (Mo. 2013) (en banc). 
 15. See id. 
 16. The SLPS district is normally operated by the Board of Education of the City 
of St. Louis.  Breitenfeld, 399 S.W.3d at 819 n.2.  The Transitional School District of 
the City of St. Louis operated SLPS after it became unaccredited.  Id.  SLPS will be 
used to refer to the unaccredited and transitional school district for the rest of this 
Note to alleviate confusion.  This district is also known as the St. Louis City School 
District. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Breitenfeld did not begin the lawsuit as the only Plaintiff; however, by the 
time the first case, Turner v. School District of Clayton, 318 S.W.3d 660 (Mo. 2010) 
(en banc), was remanded by the Supreme Court of Missouri, all other plaintiffs had 
removed themselves from the litigation for various reasons.  Id. at 821 n.7. 
 19. Id. at 837 n.32. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 837 n.32.  The trial court calculated the amount owed to Clayton as 
$49,133.33; however, the trial court did not use the transfer statute formula to calcu-
late those tuition costs.  Id.  The Supreme Court of Missouri remanded the case for the 
trial court to determine the amount owed to the Clayton School District using the 
formula established by the transfer statute.  Id. at 837-38. 
 24. Id. at 821. 
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costs.25  Taxpayers from Clayton and one taxpayer from SLPS were allowed 
to intervene in the case by the lower court in order to represent the position 
that the transfer statute violated the Hancock Amendment of the Missouri 
Constitution because it was an “unfunded mandate.”26  An unfunded mandate 
occurs when the state government requires the local government to undertake 
any new or increased activities without providing the funding for those activi-
ties.27  The Hancock Amendment prohibits the state government from doing 
this.28  In response to the contention that the transfer statute violated the Han-
cock Amendment, Breitenfeld argued that the transfer statute “[did] not create 
a new or increased activity or service within the meaning of the Hancock 
Amendment” and therefore was constitutional and should be enforced.29 
Both SLPS and Clayton raised the defense of “impossibility of compli-
ance” as the basis for which they should have been allowed to disregard the 
transfer statute.30  The school districts introduced evidence of their operation 
costs of complying with the transfer statute based on the Jones Report, “a 
2011 statistical study estimating the likelihood that students would transfer 
under [the transfer statute] from the unaccredited SLPS to certain adjoining 
St. Louis County school districts.”31  The report was used in lieu of data 
based on actual transfers under the statute because no “transfers from SLPS 
to an accredited school district in St Louis County actually had occurred.”32 
Relying on Jones Report data, the SLPS superintendent testified “that 
the estimated [S]ection 167.131 tuition and transportation costs for the stu-
dent transfers . . . could be as high as $262 million.”33  According to the su-
perintendent, these estimated transfers would make it “impossible for SLPS 
to maintain or improve its current attendance and academic achievements and 
adequately educate remaining students.”34  The Jones Report estimates also 
 
 25. Id. at 821-22. 
 26. Id. at 821, 824; see MO. CONST. art. X, §§ 16-24. 
 27. See Breitenfeld, 399 S.W.3d at 826-27. 
 28. MO. CONST. art. X, § 16. 
 29. Breitenfeld, 399 S.W.3d at 827. 
 30. Id. at 822. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id.  The Jones Report was a study done by a university professor in which 
telephone survey participants were asked to rank seven identified “school selection 
factors” by importance.  Id. at 822 n.11.  Participants in the Jones Report were also 
informed of the six St. Louis County school districts whose students performed the 
highest on a State assessment test.  Id.  Participants were then “asked if one of these 
districts or another district would be their ‘first choice.’”  Id.  The Jones Report was 
challenged at trial by Breitenfeld as being “too speculative and not backed by any 
other research.”  Id.  However, the testimony of a school administrator established 
that the report “provided the only available information for SLPS and the St. Louis 
County school districts to use in planning for potential [S]ection 167.131 transfers.”  
Id. 
 33. Id. at 823. 
 34. Id. 
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worried Clayton officials because, as one Clayton administrator testified, the 
school district would more than double in size with the estimated transfers 
making it “impossible without years of advance planning and construction to 
accommodate the 3,567 transfer students that the Jones Report estimated 
would enroll in Clayton.”35 
The trial court agreed with the taxpayer interveners, finding “that 
[S]ection 167.131 was unenforceable as to the defendant school districts be-
cause it was an ‘unfunded mandate’ in violation of the Hancock Amend-
ment.”36  In holding that the transfer statute violated the Hancock Amend-
ment, the lower court said the statute “created new and increased activity or 
service for school districts over and above what was required in 1980.”37  The 
trial court also agreed with the defendant school districts that it would be 
“impossible” for them to comply with the statute.38  Judgment was entered in 
favor of Clayton against Breitenfeld on the claim of unpaid tuition owed by 
Breitenfeld to educate her children totaling $49,133.33.39 
The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the trial court’s decision.40  It 
held that the transfer statute did not violate the Hancock Amendment and 
determined that the defense of impossibility was not available to the defend-
ant school districts in this case.41 
The court held that under Section 167.131 if a school district was re-
quired to provide only a “greater frequency” of existing activities or services 
and not new services or an increased level of services, the statute did not vio-
late the Hancock Amendment if the district could not prove that the mandate 
was unfunded beyond speculative evidence.42  The court reasoned that be-
cause SLPS had received provisional accreditation, the situation would not 
reach the “‘impossibilities’ claimed by the defendant school districts,” which 
involved thousands of students.43  Therefore, the defense of impossibility was 
not available to the school districts,44 and the districts were required to com-
ply with Section 167.131.45 
The court remanded the case to the trial court, ordering the trial court to 
recalculate the amount of tuition SLPS owed Clayton according to the formu-
la in the transfer statute.46  At the close of the litigation, the Breitenfeld chil-
dren continued to attend Clayton.47 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 823-24. 
 37. Id. at 824. 
 38. Id. at 825. 
 39. Id. at 837 n.32. 
 40. Id. at 838. 
 41. Id. at 834, 836. 
 42. Id. at 831. 
 43. Id. at 836. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See id. at 835. 
 46. Id. at 838. 
 47. See id. at 837 n.32. 
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Following the ruling in Breitenfeld, an unaccredited school district in 
Missouri must pay tuition for its students to attend an accredited district, and 
accredited districts must accept students transferring from unaccredited dis-
tricts because the law requiring the districts to do so is constitutional.48   
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This Part first discusses the transfer statute and its history.  It then ex-
plains the Hancock Amendment of the Missouri Constitution.  Finally, it 
delves into various challenges previously brought against the transfer statute 
on several grounds. 
A. Transfer Statute: Section 167.131 
Section 167.131 was originally enacted in 193149 and as of 1980 – a 
date that is important for Hancock Amendment reasons50 – the statute ad-
dressed only Missouri school districts that educated students between kinder-
garten and eighth grade.51  A 1993 revision of the statute changed the lan-
guage slightly,52 resulting in two important consequences: the statute no 
longer provides receiving school districts the discretion to accept or reject 
students,53 and the statute now applies to “any district that does not maintain 
an accredited school.”54 
The transfer statute’s current language states in pertinent part: 
[T]he board of education of each district in this state that does not 
maintain an accredited school pursuant to the authority of the state 
board of education to classify schools as established in [S]ection 
161.092 shall pay the tuition of and provide transportation consistent 
with the provisions of [S]ection 167.241 for each pupil resident there-
in who attends an accredited school in another district of the same or 
 
 48. See id. at 826-28. 
 49. Kimberly Jade Norwood, Liddell Is Forty: Commemorating the Desegrega-
tion Movement in St. Louis, and a Look at the Future of Urban Education: Article: 
Minnie Liddell’s Forty-Year Quest for Quality Public Education Remains a Dream 
Deferred, 40 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 37 n.173 (2012). 
 50. See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text. 
 51. Brief of Taxpayer Respondents, Blue Springs Sch. Dist. v. Sch. Dist. of Kan. 
City, 415 S.W.3d 110 (Mo. 2013) (en banc) (No. SC92932), 2013 WL 4790465, at 
*2. 
 52. See Turner v. Sch. Dist. of Clayton, 318 S.W.3d 660, 669 (Mo. 2010) (en 
banc) [hereinafter Turner II]; Brief of Taxpayer Respondents, supra note 51, at *2. 
 53. Turner II, 318 S.W.3d at 669. 
 54. Brief of Taxpayer Respondents, supra note 51, at *2 (emphasis added) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). 
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an adjoining county . . . each pupil shall be free to attend the public 
school of his or her choice.55 
The Supreme Court of Missouri has ruled that the transfer law applies to 
any district that, as a whole, has been classified as unaccredited by the state 
board of education or that maintains at least one school which has been clas-
sified as unaccredited by the state board.56  The court has also ruled that the 
statute does not allow discretion of the receiving district to accept or reject a 
transferring student, as evidenced by the clear intent of the legislature in re-
moving the discretionary language from the transfer statute in 1993.57 
Section 167.241 of the Missouri Revised Statutes – which is mentioned 
in the transfer law – sets out guidelines regarding transportation of pupils, 
stating that districts that are required to provide pupils with transportation 
pursuant to the transfer statute need only provide transportation to an accred-
ited school district that is designated by the unaccredited district.58 
B. The Hancock Amendment 
The Hancock Amendment to the Missouri Constitution was enacted in 
1980 during a period of time when many similar fiscal reforms were emerg-
ing across the United States.59  This kind of statute is known as a “tax and 
expenditure limit” (“TEL”), and attempts to limit tax burdens on state citi-
zens.60  Missouri’s TEL – the Hancock Amendment – prohibits the state from 
requiring “any new or expanded activities by counties and other political sub-
divisions without full state financing, or from shifting the tax burden to coun-
ties and other political subdivisions.”61  Further, the state cannot reduce “the 
state financed proportion of the costs of any existing activity or service re-
quired of counties and other political subdivisions.”62  The amendment also 
provides that “any taxpayer of the state, county or other political subdivision 
shall have standing to bring suit in a circuit court of proper venue and addi-
tionally, when the state is involved, in the Missouri Supreme Court, to en-
force [the Hancock Amendment].”63 
Missouri courts have stated that the purpose of the Hancock Amend-
ment is to “limit taxes by establishing tax and revenue limits and expenditure 
limits for the state and other political subdivisions which may not be exceed-
 
 55. MO. REV. STAT. § 167.131 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 56. Turner II, 318 S.W.3d at 665. 
 57. Id. at 669. 
 58. MO. REV. STAT. § 167.241 (2012). 
 59. Jonathan G. Bremer, Note, Pulling the Taxpayer’s Sword from the Stone: 
The Appropriation Requirement of Missouri’s Hancock Amendment, 77 MO. L. REV. 
481, 484 (2012). 
 60. Id. 
 61. MO. CONST. art. X, § 16. 
 62. Id. at § 21. 
 63. Id. at § 23. 
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ed without voter approval.”64  Put differently, “[t]he Hancock Amendment 
aspires to erect a comprehensive, constitutionally-rooted shield to protect 
taxpayers from the government’s ability to increase the tax burden above that 
borne by the taxpayers on November 4, 1980.”65  The amendment proposes to 
prohibit the state from reducing the proportion of state funding to a county or 
other political subdivision for a state mandated activity or service after No-
vember 4, 1980 – the day the Hancock Amendment was enacted.66 
Missouri courts have long evaluated challenges to statutes under the 
Hancock Amendment using the two-part test laid out in Miller v. Director of 
Revenue: “[B]y its plain language, a violation of [the Hancock Amendment] 
exists if both (1) a new or increased activity or service is required of a politi-
cal subdivision by the State and (2) the political subdivision experiences in-
creased costs in performing that activity or service.”67  The court in Miller 
articulated that a challenge to a statute under the Hancock Amendment that is 
based on “speculation and conjecture, fails to overcome the presumption of 
constitutionality which [all Missouri statutes] enjoy[].”68  The court articulat-
ed in Neske v. City of St. Louis that simply increasing the cost of an existing 
responsibility would not satisfy the first prong of the unfunded mandate test, 
which requires a new or increased activity or service.69 
C. Challenges to the Transfer Statute 
Challenges to the transfer statute have been limited in nature.  Before 
Breitenfeld, the Supreme Court of Missouri had never decided the transfer 
statute’s validity under a Hancock Amendment challenge.  However, the 
transfer statute was previously invoked in litigation regarding parents’ restitu-
tion for tuition payments already incurred to send their children to an accred-
ited district70 and regarding who had standing to bring a Hancock Amend-
ment challenge against the statute.71 
In Turner v. School District of Clayton (“Turner I”), parents who resid-
ed in SLPS, and whose children attended Clayton pursuant to a tuition 
agreement, requested that Clayton charge SLPS for their children’s tuition.72  
This occurred after SLPS became unaccredited and the parents believed 
 
 64. Rohrer v. Emmons, 289 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Bremer, supra note 59, at 487. 
 67. 719 S.W.2d 787, 788-89 (Mo. 1986) (en banc). 
 68. Id. at 789. 
 69. 218 S.W.3d 417, 422-23 (Mo. 2007) (en banc). 
 70. See Turner II, 318 S.W.3d 660, 663 (Mo. 2010) (en banc); Turner v. Sch. 
Dist. of Clayton, No. ED 92226, 2009 WL 1752140, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. June 23, 
2009) [hereinafter Turner I]. 
 71. King-Willmann v. Webster Groves Sch. Dist., 361 S.W.3d 414, 416-17 (Mo. 
2012) (en banc). 
 72. Turner I, No. ED 92226, 2009 WL 1752140, at *1. 
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SLPS was responsible for the payments to Clayton under Section 167.131.73  
Clayton declined to comply with the parents’ request, and the parents brought 
suit against Clayton and SLPS.74  The parents sought a declaratory judgment 
stating that SLPS was responsible for paying their children’s tuition pursuant 
to Section 167.131 after SLPS lost its accreditation in 2007.75  Both the trial 
court and the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District ruled that the 
transfer statute was inapplicable to the case because the children were attend-
ing Clayton schools pursuant to a tuition agreement between the school dis-
trict and the parents.76  The Court of Appeals required the parents, rather than 
the unaccredited district, to pay the tuition to Clayton, because the parents 
were contractually obligated to do so under the tuition agreement.77  The 
Court of Appeals transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Missouri, pur-
suant to Rule 83.02, “[b]ecause of the general interest and importance of the 
issues involved.”78 
The case argued before the Supreme Court of Missouri after transfer 
was also called Turner v. School District of Clayton (“Turner II”).79  The 
Supreme Court in Turner II disagreed with the lower courts in Turner I, stat-
ing, “It is clear that [Section] 167.131 applies to [SLPS], that it required 
[Clayton] to admit the students and that it mandates the transitional school 
district to pay the students’ tuition.”80 
First, the court looked to the plain language of the transfer statute to de-
termine that it applied to SLPS in the case at bar: “Because the plain and or-
dinary language of [Section] 167.131 does not limit its application [to situa-
tions in which an individual school and not a whole district loses accredita-
tion] as urged by the transitional school district, there is no need to analyze 
the legislative history of the statute.”81  Therefore, the court held that SLPS 
was in fact unaccredited for purposes of the transfer statute and that the situa-
tion fell within the statute’s plain language.82 
Second, the court addressed Clayton’s argument that a district retained 
discretionary power to admit transfer students pursuant to Section 167.020 
and, therefore, admittance was not mandatory as the language of Section 
167.131 might suggest.83  The court treated this argument the same way it 
treated the argument that the transfer statute did not apply: “The plain and 
ordinary meaning of the language in [Section] 167.131 that ‘each pupil shall 
be free to attend the public school of his or her choice’ gives a student the 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at *4-5. 
 77. Id. at *5. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Turner II, 318 S.W.3d 660 (Mo. 2010) (en banc). 
 80. Id. at 664. 
 81. Id. at 665. 
 82. Id. at 664-65. 
 83. Id. at 668-69. 
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choice of an accredited school to attend . . . and requires the chosen school to 
accept the pupil.”84  The court said this reading of the statute was especially 
supported by the statute’s legislative history because a prior version of the 
statute included language stating that “no school shall be required to admit 
any pupil.”85  Because the legislature specifically removed this discretionary 
language, the schools were mandated to admit transfer students under Section 
167.131.86 
After analyzing the plain language of Section 167.131, the court held 
that the statute applied to SLPS and that Clayton did not have discretion to 
admit or deny transfer students under the statute.  Therefore, SLPS was re-
sponsible for paying tuition for all four families’ children to attend Clayton.87 
Two years later, in King-Wilmann v. Webster Groves School District, 
the Supreme Court of Missouri was presented with a challenge to the transfer 
statute which alleged that the statute violated the Hancock Amendment by 
creating an unfunded mandate.88  In a similar situation to that of Turner II, 
the plaintiff in King-Wilmann sought to be enrolled in an accredited school 
district, Webster Groves, when the school in her place of residence became 
unaccredited pursuant to the transfer statute.89  Webster Groves asserted the 
defense that Section 167.131 violated the Hancock Amendment “by requiring 
a new activity or service without full state financing.”90 
The Supreme Court of Missouri found that Webster Groves, as a school 
district and not a taxpayer, did not have standing to assert the provisions of 
the Hancock Amendment as a defense.91  The language of the amendment 
was clear that “‘any taxpayer’ of the state, county or other political subdivi-
sion shall have standing to bring suit to enforce the Hancock Amendment.”92  
In making its decision, the court looked to its previous ruling in Fort Zumwalt 
School District v. State, where the court found that only taxpayers could bring 
suit to enforce the Hancock Amendment and that a school district was not a 
taxpayer.93  Webster Groves attempted to argue that, because it was using the 
Hancock Amendment as a defense rather than bringing suit itself, its case was 
distinct from Fort Zumwalt.94  However, Webster Groves’ argument did not 
succeed.95  Therefore, in King-Wilmann, the court did not decide the issue of 
whether Section 167.131 violated the Hancock Amendment because it found 
 
 84. Id. at 669. 
 85. Id. (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 167.131.2 (1986)). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 664. 
 88. 361 S.W.3d 414, 416 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. (citing MO. CONST. art. X, § 23). 
 93. Id. at 416-17 (citing Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist. v. State, 896 S.W.2d 918, 921 
(Mo. 1995) (en banc)). 
 94. Id. at 417. 
 95. Id. 
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol79/iss3/8
2014] MISSOURI'S SCHOOL TRANSFER LAW 793 
that Webster Groves did not have standing.96  The first time the court con-
fronted this issue was in Breitenfeld in June of 2013.97  
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
In Breitenfeld v. School District of Clayton, the court held that the 
school transfer statute did not constitute an unfunded mandate in violation of 
the Hancock Amendment of the Missouri Constitution.98  The Honorable 
Mary R. Russell wrote the unanimous opinion articulating that the transfer 
statute did not violate the Hancock Amendment because the education re-
quirement imposed no new or increased activity or service and because the 
transportation mandate of the statute was not proved to be “unfunded.”99 
The court began its analysis by laying out the two-part test a Missouri 
court uses to determine if a statute violates the Hancock Amendment: “if 
both: (1) the State requires a new or increased activity or service of political 
subdivisions; and (2) the political subdivisions experience increased costs in 
performing that activity or service,” a violation exists. 100 
The court then explained what was necessary for both prongs to be 
met.101  The first prong of the test is satisfied if “the State requires local enti-
ties to begin a new mandated activity or to increase the level of an existing 
activity beyond the level required on November 4, 1980.”102  A statute that 
requires “continuance of an existing activity or service” does not meet the 
first prong of the test, nor does “increased frequency of undertaking a given 
activity or service” by virtue of “more requests for performance of an existing 
activity or service.”103  The second prong of the test is met when “political 
subdivisions experience increased costs in performing the new activity or 
service at issue because the State provides insufficient funding to offset the 
full costs of compliance.”104 
The court’s analysis determined that neither the requirement of the un-
accredited districts to pay tuition for students to attend accredited schools nor 
the requirement of the accredited schools to accept the transfer students met 
the first prong of the unfunded mandate test because the education require-
ments were not new or increased.105  Both districts were required to 
“provid[e] eligible students in grades K-12 a free public education” before the 
transfer statute was enacted, and both school districts “simply would be con-
 
 96. Id. at 416-17. 
 97. Breitenfeld v. Sch. Dist. of Clayton, 399 S.W.3d 816 (Mo. 2013) (en banc). 
 98. Id. at 834. 
 99. Id. at 831, 834. 
 100. Id. at 826 (emphasis added). 
 101. Id. at 826-27. 
 102. Id. at 826. 
 103. Id. at 826-27. 
 104. Id. at 827. 
 105. Id. at 828. 
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tinuing to provide those services even if [S]ection 167.131 transfers were 
effectuated.”106  The court also stated that the level of services provided by 
Clayton would not be increased because of an influx of transfer students, but 
rather the school district would be providing the same level of services to 
more students – merely providing the services with “greater frequency.”107 
The court held that because the districts were not required to provide 
new or increased services or activities under the school transfer law, the first 
prong of the unfunded mandate test was not met and therefore the transfer 
statute’s educational requirements did not violate the Hancock Amend-
ment.108  The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the trial court’s decision 
insomuch as the trial court found that the transfer statute “create[d] an un-
funded mandate for providing educational services.”109 
The court then justified its decision that Section 167.131 did not violate 
the Hancock Amendment by determining that the Hancock Amendment did 
not prohibit local-to-local burden-shifting of an existing activity or service.110  
Rather, its purpose was to “prohibit burden-shifting from the State to a local 
entity.”111  The transfer statute, according to the court, shifted the existing 
responsibility of educating students among local political subdivisions.112  It 
was not the Hancock Amendment’s purpose to “prevent this local-to-local 
shifting of responsibilities” because the “overall purpose of the Hancock 
Amendment was to prevent the State from avoiding taxation and spending 
limitations by shifting its responsibilities to local governments.”113  There-
fore, because the transfer statute only “reallocate[s] responsibilities . . . 
among school districts . . . the purpose of Hancock [was] not fundamentally 
violated.”114 
Next, the court conceded that one section of the school transfer law did 
meet the first prong of the unfunded mandate test.115  That section required 
the unaccredited school district to provide transportation to students wishing 
to transfer to a district of the unaccredited district’s choice.116  This transpor-
tation mandate of the transfer statute was found to be “new” by the court be-
cause it “alter[ed] the statutory provision of providing transportation ‘within’ 
a school district and require[d] the unaccredited school district to provide 
[S]ection 167.131 transfer students transportation to out-of-district 
schools.”117  The mandate was especially new for SLPS because previous 
 
 106. Id. at 828, 830. 
 107. Id. at 831. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 831-32. 
 115. Id. at 833. 
 116. Id. at 832. 
 117. Id. at 833. 
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transportation requirements exempted “metropolitan district[s].”118  There-
fore, this section met the first prong of the unfunded mandate test because 
SLPS had to provide transportation for transfer students to a different school 
district where they had not provided any transportation before.119 
The court rejected SLPS’s argument that the transportation section of 
the transfer statute violated the Hancock Amendment because the second 
prong of the unfunded mandate test was not met.120  The court opined that the 
second prong is only met if there is proof that the mandate is unfunded.121  
SLPS provided no evidence beyond speculation in regard to the costs of 
complying with the transportation section of the transfer statute.122  The court 
found that “[e]vidence that is merely speculative cannot support a finding of 
an unfunded mandate in violation of the Hancock Amendment.”123  Thus, the 
Supreme Court reversed the trial court and found that the transportation sec-
tion of the transfer statute did not constitute an “unfunded mandate” in viola-
tion of the Hancock Amendment.124 
The court finished its decision by addressing the defendant school dis-
trict’s attempt to raise the defense of impossibility.125  The districts claimed it 
would be impossible for each to comply with the transfer statute because 
Clayton could not provide the necessary resources for the transfer students 
and SLPS could not afford to pay the tuition costs for transfer students.126  
The court analyzed this defense by first concluding that it was usually used in 
the contract law context but had been used before as a “valid excuse[] for 
noncompliance with a statute.”127  Next, the court determined that in order to 
apply the concept of impossibility as a defense, the party asserting it must 
have “demonstrated that virtually every action possible to promote compli-
ance with the contract [or statute] ha[d] been performed.”128  The court de-
clined to address this issue, however, finding that the “impossibilities” the 
school districts claimed could no longer occur in light of SLPS gaining condi-
tional accreditation in 2012, thereby narrowing the case at hand to only the 
two Breitenfeld children.129  According to the court, the districts complying 
with the transfer statute in the case of just those two children “[did] not yield 
the ‘impossibilities’ claimed by the defendant school districts.”130  The Su-
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 833-34. 
 121. Id. at 833. 
 122. Id. at 834. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 835-36 (citing Egenreither ex rel. Egenreither v. Carter, 23 S.W.3d 
641, 646 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 128. Id. at 835. 
 129. Id. at 836. 
 130. Id. 
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preme Court reversed the decision of the trial court to accept the impossibility 
defense raised by the defendant school districts.131 
The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the trial court’s decision in its 
entirety and remanded the case for proceedings not inconsistent with its deci-
sion.132 
V. COMMENT 
The Supreme Court of Missouri’s ruling in Breitenfeld and the law itself 
have detrimental effects on the transferred students, the unaccredited school 
districts forced to pay tuition, the accredited school districts forced to receive 
the transferred students, and Missouri’s accreditation system.  Students trans-
ferring from the unaccredited district to the accredited district are the only 
beneficiaries of the transfer law, and the benefit to them hardly outweighs the 
burdens to the school districts and the accreditation system.  The fact that the 
law results overwhelmingly in negative consequences weighs in favor of 
amending or repealing the law – steps that must be taken by the Missouri 
legislature. 
A. The Transfer Law and Breitenfeld’s Ramifications   
Students that transfer, unaccredited districts, districts receiving transfer 
students, and the accreditation system all experience troublesome conse-
quences from the enforcement of the transfer law.  It is also foreseeable that 
the ruling in Breitenfeld may result in abuses of the transfer law. 
While it is the decision of the student and his or her parent(s) to transfer 
from an unaccredited district to an accredited one, the student and his or her 
family are put in somewhat of a Catch-22.  The transferred students were 
intended to benefit from the transfer law because they would be receiving a 
“better” education, but there are negative consequences to transferring stu-
dents from an unaccredited district to an accredited one under the transfer 
law. 
Students from unaccredited districts could be at a different learning lev-
el than their counterparts in the accredited district to which they choose to 
 
 131. Id.  Further, the Supreme Court of Missouri determined that the taxpayer 
interveners had been properly allowed to intervene under Rule 52.12(b) and that there 
was no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in that regard.  Id. at 837.  The Supreme 
Court also reversed the trial court’s decision to award attorney fees to the intervenors 
because the intervenors no longer had a successful Hancock Amendment challenge 
that warranted the award of attorney fees.  Id.  On the issue of tuition owed by 
Breitenfeld to the Clayton school district, the Supreme Court ordered the tuition be 
recalculated to reflect that SLPS, rather than Breitenfeld, would be responsible for 
some, if not all, of the tuition costs under the transfer statute because it was enforcea-
ble.  Id. at 837-38. 
 132. Id. at 838. 
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transfer.133  Parents of students in some accredited districts have been out-
spoken with their concerns that students from unaccredited districts “might 
struggle to keep pace academically.”134  Some students may be behind other 
students his or her age in the new district, while some students might be per-
forming at higher levels.135  Either student could easily be short-changed by a 
new district that might not take the time to lend extra help to the struggling 
student or to properly place an advanced student.136  Students in both of these 
situations will be negatively affected, and the transfer law will not fulfill its 
intended purpose, which according to Chris Nicastro, the Commissioner of 
Education, is to provide the transferring students with a better education than 
they would have received in their own unaccredited district.137 
Transfer students could also face instability as a result of the transfer 
law.  Some transferring students may have to travel up to thirty miles to at-
tend an accredited school district.138  An hour commute in the morning plus 
an hour commute in the evening is a heavy burden to a child, adding to the 
difficulties that arise from trying to assimilate into a new district.139  Addi-
tionally there is the possibility that the student will have to return to his or her 
home district if that district regains accreditation.  These are some of the 
many potential hardships a student may face while trying to obtain a better 
education.140  These factors might make a potential transfer student’s par-
ent(s) think twice before deciding to send a child to an accredited district 
under the transfer law; this decision becomes even harder when the choice is 
between these disadvantageous consequences and a substandard education.   
There are adverse consequences imposed also on both the unaccredited 
districts forced to pay tuition and transportation costs and the accredited dis-
tricts forced to accept the transferring students.  Although an exact number is 
not known, according to Kelvin Andrews, superintendent of SLPS, students 
fled from SLPS in “alarming numbers” when it became unaccredited in 
2007.141  As of the writing of this Note, the situation facing the unaccredited 
 
 133. Dale Singer, Lawmakers Ponder Changes to Missouri School Transfer Law, 
ST. LOUIS BEACON (July 5, 2013, 7:09 AM), https://www.stlbeacon.org/#!/content/
31729/legislative_transfer_changes_070313. 
 134. John Eligon, In Missouri, Race Complicates a Transfer to Better Schools, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/01/us/in-missouri-
race-complicates-a-transfer-to-better-schools.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&. 
 135. Singer, supra note 133. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See Elisa Crouch, Missouri Legislators Hear Pleas to Address School Trans-
fer Law, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Oct. 2, 2013, 12:15 AM), http://www.stltoday
.com/news/local/education/missouri-legislators-hear-pleas-to-address-school-transfer-
law/article_718d44fa-ad93-5541-97b3-1fae15d008b3.html. 
 138. Shelly, supra note 1. 
 139. Cf. id. 
 140. Eligon, supra note 134. 
 141. Kelvin R. Adams, St. Louis Public Schools Have Come Far in Five Years, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Sept. 20, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.stltoday.com/
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districts of Normandy and Riverview Gardens shows that students transfer-
ring out of those districts number 1,189 and 1,451 respectively.142  In the 
Kansas City Public Schools’ situation, where a case based on the transfer 
statute was decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri shortly after Breiten-
feld, estimates showed that as many as 7,759 students might have left that 
district to attend nearby accredited districts.143  However, this mass exodus 
never occurred because the Kansas City Public School district was granted 
provisional accreditation in early August of 2014.144 
The largest effect on the unaccredited districts is possible bankruptcy or 
insolvency.145  According to Commissioner of Education Chris Nicastro, 
“The transfer program as it’s currently conceived is not sustainable.  It bank-
rupts sending school districts.”146  Normandy School District’s superintendent 
claims the transfer law “kill[s] schools like [Normandy] indirectly because 
they’re taking the resources.  [The law will] negatively impact [Normandy] 
because of the financial side.”147  These school officials’ statements are re-
flected in the statistics.148  The Normandy and Riverview School Districts are 
expected to spend $30 million on tuition for transferring nearly 1,200 stu-
dents.149  The lack of funds remaining in the unaccredited district leaves little 
opportunity for students who stay to get the quality education they deserve, 
according to Nicastro.150  The Normandy district was projected to be finan-
cially insolvent as early as March of 2014.151  The state took over the district 
in the summer of 2014 to save it from bankruptcy and, as of August 2014, the 
Normandy district was considered “credited with state oversight,” which 




 142. Associated Press, Missouri Supreme Court Hears Transfer Case: Suburban 
Districts Argue They Can’t Handle Influx of Enrollment, KMBC (Oct. 2, 2013, 7:46 
PM), http://www.kmbc.com/news/kansas-city/missouri-supreme-court-hears-transfer-
case/-/11664182/22245438/-/nflhfrz/-/index.html. 
 143. Id.; see Brief of Taxpayer Respondents, supra note 51, at *10 (emphasis 
added). 
 144. Joe Robertson, Kansas City School District Gains Provisional Accreditation, 
KAN. CITY STAR (Aug. 6, 2014, 1:50 PM), http://www.kansascity.com/news/local/
article1158397.html. 
 145. Shelly, supra note 1; Crouch, supra note 137. 
 146. Shelly, supra note 1. 
 147. Eligon, supra note 134. 
 148. See Alan Scher Zagier & Heather Hollingsworth, Missouri School Transfer 
Ruling Opens Old Wounds, YAHOO! NEWS (Aug. 8, 2013, 11:47 AM), http://news.
yahoo.com/missouri-school-transfer-ruling-opens-old-wounds-071804741.html. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Marshall Griffin, Missouri Education Leader Says Student Transfer Law Will 
Financially Cripple Unaccredited Schools, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Oct. 1, 2013, 
11:54 PM), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/mo-education-leader-says-student-
transfer-law-will-financially-cripple-unaccredited-schools. 
 151. Crouch, supra note 137. 
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167.131.152  This change did not occur, however, until the detrimental effects 
of the transfer law were already felt within the Normandy district: the school 
board voted to lay off 103 teachers and to close one of its elementary schools 
at the end of October 2013 in order to save money.153 
One only needs to look back to 2010 to see more crippling financial ef-
fects of the transfer law in action.154  The Wellston School District in the St. 
Louis area lost accreditation in 2003 and finished reimbursing school districts 
for transferring students’ tuition seven years later when it shut down.155  This 
is just one example of how the transfer law is detrimental to the unaccredited 
districts that are forced to pay tuition for transferring students. 
The school transfer law is also detrimental to the accredited school dis-
tricts to which students choose to transfer.  Similar to concerns aimed at the 
transfer students themselves,156 school districts receiving transfer students 
may see negative effects as a result of transfer students entering at different 
academic levels than their current student counterparts.157  Parents and ad-
ministrators worry that teachers will have to “slow down to allow students 
from struggling districts to catch up.”158  This slower pace could ultimately 
hurt the education of current students at the accredited districts.159  There are 
concerns that students transferring into the accredited district might have 
lower test scores, bringing down the accredited district’s average scores, and 
that the additional time spent helping the transfer students catch up could 
result in current district students achieving lower scores because of the “slow 
down” in curriculum.160 
Accredited districts forced to accept transfer students under the transfer 
law are also negatively affected by overcrowding.  Many studies have shown 
a link between smaller class size and greater student achievement.161  The 
school transfer law is likely to result in larger class sizes in accredited dis-
 
 152. Emily Wax-Thibodeaux, At Brown’s Impoverished High School, Students 




 153. Dale Singer, Normandy Board Votes Not to Pay Tuition Bills for Transfer 
Students, ST. LOUIS BEACON (Oct. 24, 2013, 10:23 PM), https://www.stlbeacon.org/
#!/content/33388/normandy_tuition_payments_102413?coverpage=4202. 
 154. See Zagier & Hollingsworth, supra note 148. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See sources cited supra notes 133-140 and accompanying text. 
 157. See Eligon, supra note 134. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Singer, supra note 133. 
 160. See Eligon, supra note 134; Zagier & Hollingsworth, supra note 148. 
 161. See How Important Is Class Size?, GREATERSCHOOLS.ORG, http://www.gre-
atschools.org/find-a-school/defining-your-ideal/174-class-size.gs?page=all (last visit-
ed June 3, 2014). 
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tricts as more students leave the unaccredited districts.162  This is especially 
true because the accredited districts are unable to turn transfer students away; 
a district must accept all students wishing to transfer under the law, which 
could result in an influx of thousands of students in the accredited districts.163 
Clayton argued to the Supreme Court of Missouri in Breitenfeld that “it 
would be impossible for [the district] to provide the educational facilities and 
resources necessary to educate the potentially thousands of additional stu-
dents.”164 
Perhaps the most far-reaching consequences of the transfer law are the 
potential negative consequences on the Missouri accreditation system.  First, 
the transfer law nearly eliminates students’ incentive to perform in a way that 
would help their districts maintain accreditation165 and may create a kind of 
“unaccredited domino effect.”  Schools become accredited or lose their ac-
creditation based on a variety of factors including academics, attendance, and 
graduation rates.166  A school district’s academic performance, attendance, 
and graduation rates are directly influenced in part by the choices of its stu-
dents.  Therefore, a student who received low grades and/or failed to attend 
school regularly in the unaccredited school district that transfers from that 
unaccredited district to an accredited one may continue to receive low grades 
and/or fail to attend school regularly in the accredited district.167  There is 
little point in having an accreditation system if students that may contribute to 
the cause of the district being unaccredited can transfer to an accredited dis-
trict once their district becomes unaccredited.  The transfer law creates little 
incentive for students to care about whether their district becomes unaccredit-
ed and could create an “unaccredited domino effect” wherein district after 
district loses accreditation, rendering the system almost irrelevant.  Eliminat-
ing student accountability also undermines the accreditation system and plac-
es the sole responsibility of accreditation status on the teachers and admin-
istration. 
 
 162. See Zagier & Hollingsworth, supra note 148. 
 163. Singer, supra note 133. 
 164. Breitenfeld v. Sch. Dist. of Clayton, 399 S.W.3d 816, 834 (Mo. 2013) (en 
banc). 
 165. This argument is not meant to suggest that the students alone are or should be 
responsible for maintaining a district’s accreditation or even that the responsibility is 
or should be placed primarily on their shoulders, but, rather, that students and their 
choices are one of many contributing factors.  Poverty, violent neighborhoods, home 
life, and other potential influencers that are out of a student’s control do play a role in 
the decision-making processes of youth; therefore, it is perhaps these issues, and not 
the students making some kind of conscious decision not to care, which are at the 
very root of why districts become unaccredited to begin with.  That topic is beyond 
the scope of this Note. 
 166. Crouch, supra note 137; see also supra note 4. 
 167. See Singer, supra note 133. 
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Second, the transfer law also creates incentives to circumvent the entire 
accreditation system.168  Decision-making officials no doubt consider all the 
negative consequences the school transfer law has on an unaccredited district.  
This might urge the officials to give an unaccredited district its provisional 
accreditation sooner than it should,169 or could perhaps influence officials to 
refrain from giving unaccredited status to a district.170  Such a situation nearly 
occurred when Chris Nicastro had to decide in September of 2013 whether or 
not to give Kansas City Public Schools provisional accreditation.171  As one 
opinion piece that discussed the Blue Springs case and Chris Nicastro’s deci-
sion pointed out, “[c]ompared with the chaos that will befall the Kansas City 
and outlying school districts if transfers begin, provisional accreditation 
seemed like a better alternative, even though it would be jumping the gun on 
the process.”172  If officials take a similar position that the “chaos” is just not 
worth it and “jump the gun,” the accreditation system will be rendered worth-
less.  “It doesn’t do any good to have an accountability system if you com-
promise its integrity,” Nicastro said. 
In 2013, Kansas City Public Schools remained unaccredited, despite a 
higher score on its annual performance report.173  The district received provi-
sional accreditation in August 2014.174  It is uncertain whether the possibility 
of transfers and the costs and other consequences associated with them 
weighed into the decision, as Kansas City Public Schools were able to im-
prove upon their previous positive performance report.175 
The Supreme Court of Missouri did not take any of these policy consid-
erations into account when deciding the Breitenfeld case.176  The only issues 
that were even addressed by the court were the negative effects on the respec-
tive school districts sending and accepting transfer students.177  The court 
acknowledged but did not accept the argument that the school districts would 
experience adverse effects from the transfer laws, making it impossible for 
the districts to comply with the laws.178  While the court pointed out that edu-
cation statutes are to be liberally construed, it found that changes of public 
policy “in the province of the General Assembly” pointed it in a different 
direction in construing the transfer law.179 
 
 168. See Shelly, supra note 1. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See Norwood, supra note 49, at 52. 
 171. Shelly, supra note 1. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Robertson, supra note 144. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See id. 
 176. Breitenfeld v. Sch. Dist. of Clayton, 399 S.W.3d 816, 829 n.25 (Mo. 2013) 
(en banc). 
 177. See id. at 834-36. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 829 & n.25. 
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The court decided on its own, without giving a reason, that its task in the 
Breitenfeld case “[could] not be to determine the fairness of [S]ection 
167.131 as a matter of public policy, but rather . . . [must be] to assess wheth-
er the statute violates the Hancock Amendment by imposing an unfunded 
mandate.”180  According to the court, if the statute gave students easier access 
to education without violating the Hancock Amendment, then the statute was 
constitutional, “regardless of any policy rationales advanced in the parties’ 
arguments.”181  Though the court’s decision that the transfer law does not 
violate the Hancock Amendment seems to stand on solid ground, some of 
these public policy rationales merit some recognition by the court in order to 
find that the transfer law is inapplicable in some situations, including that of 
the Breitenfeld case. 
One final consequence of Breitenfeld is possible abuse of the transfer 
law to exploit the public education system.  The law is aimed at allowing 
students in unaccredited districts the opportunity to have a “better” educa-
tion.182  However, this principle is not implicated when the students using the 
transfer law to obtain tuition payments have never attended unaccredited 
schools.  All of the children of the parents involved in Breitenfeld already 
attended accredited public schools or private schools.183  Rather than being an 
opportunity for a child to receive a “better” education, the use of the transfer 
law in such a situation seems like a way to get a “free ride” where one was 
prepared to pay tuition expenses anyway. 
Similarly, because of the mandate of the transfer law requiring a school 
to accept any student transferring under the law, what is to stop citizens of 
Missouri, or surrounding states for that matter, from moving to unaccredited 
districts like SLPS to take advantage of the law?184  It is well-known that one 
of the most important considerations for a family in deciding where to live is 
the school district in the area.185  A rational person who weighed the costs and 
benefits of moving to an unaccredited district with lower housing prices and 
the ability to send her children to a prestigious school district like Clayton186 
for free would likely determine it is well worth the costs of such a move to 
 
 180. Id. at 829 n.25. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See Crouch, supra note 137. 
 183. Breitenfeld, 399 S.W.3d at 837 n.32. 
 184. See Missy McCoy, Note, Unconditional Acceptance: The Supreme Court of 
Missouri’s Interpretation of Missouri Revised Statutes Section 167.131 Turner v. 
School District of Clayton, 318 S.W.3d 660 (Mo. 2010) (En Banc) (Per Curiam), 76 
MO. L. REV. 941, 965-67 (2011). 
 185. Id. at 966. 
 186. The Clayton School District, and Clayton High School in particular, is con-
sistently ranked very high in the U.S. News Best High School Rankings.  In 2014, 
U.S. News ranked it the second highest in the state of Missouri and it ranked number 
244 in the entire nation.  Best High Schools in Missouri, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT, http://www.usnews.com/education/best-high-schools/missouri (last visited 
Aug. 26, 2014). 
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live at a lower cost and send her children to an accredited district using the 
transfer law.187  Those who take this route and those who were already in 
SLPS and invoked the transfer law would have no incentive to help SLPS 
become accredited again, but rather would be incentivized to keep SLPS un-
accredited for the duration of their children’s education.  It is unlikely that 
this is the result intended by the legislature. 
B. How to Alleviate the Problems 
Unfortunately, change is unlikely to be initiated by the Supreme Court 
of Missouri because its hands are tied. Its ruling in Breitenfeld rests on solid 
reasoning supported by precedent, and the court recently affirmed the validity 
of this ruling in Blue Springs R-IV School District v. School District of Kan-
sas City.188  Despite the inability of the Supreme Court to solve the problems 
created by the transfer law, all of these problems can be alleviated if changes 
are made by Missouri lawmakers. 
The Supreme Court of Missouri had the opportunity to decide Blue 
Springs R-IV School District v. School District of Kansas City in December 
of 2013.189  Similar to the Clayton taxpayers in Breitenfeld, taxpayers from 
five Kansas City area school districts brought a suit against Kansas City Pub-
lic Schools (“KCPS”) and the State of Missouri.190  The taxpayers claimed 
that the accredited districts they lived in were being unconstitutionally re-
quired to provide new and increased levels of activities by educating the stu-
dents transferring from the unaccredited KCPS.191  The taxpayers argued that 
the Supreme Court should overrule Breitenfeld by striking down the transfer 
statute under the Missouri Constitution based on the argument that the in-
creased cost of an activity constitutes an increase in the level of services, thus 
violating the Hancock Amendment.192 
The court dismissed this argument in Breitenfeld using a one-sentence 
footnote: “[T]o the extent that School District of Kansas City v. State suggests 
in dicta that an increased cost of performing an existing activity or service 
itself can result in a Hancock violation, it is incorrect.”193  The court in Blue 
Springs R-IV School District rejected this argument again stating, “The hold-
ing in Breitenfeld is determinative.  Section 167.131 does not mandate a new 
or increased level of activity but merely reallocates responsibilities among 
school districts.”194  The court went on to explain again that there was noth-
ing new about requiring districts to provide free K-12 public education, even 
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if a specific district was being required to provide it to more students, result-
ing in a higher cost to the district.195  Thus, rather than taking the opportunity 
to fix the veritable cornucopia of issues the transfer law was already causing 
and will inevitably cause in the future, the Supreme Court of Missouri fol-
lowed its precedent and reaffirmed its ruling in Breitenfeld.196   
Accordingly, the only option for solving the problems created by the 
transfer law and the rulings in Breitenfeld and Blue Springs R-IV School Dis-
trict is change from lawmakers.  The ill-effects of the law far outweigh any 
benefits, and parents, taxpayers, and educators around Missouri have de-
manded and continue to demand that state representatives rewrite the law.197  
One change, proposed by Missouri Senator Jamilah Nasheed,198 would re-
quire accreditation to be administered on a school-by-school basis, rather than 
on a district-wide level.199  This would facilitate transfers of students from 
one school to another within that district instead of from one district to anoth-
er.200  Under the proposed law, “[the district with one unaccredited school] 
gets to keep that funding to educate [its] own kids” instead of the money go-
ing to a completely different district.201 
The legislature passed a bill in May 2014 that repealed the transfer law 
and replaced it with a law containing language similar to Senator Nasheed’s 
proposed idea for accreditation based on individual schools and not entire 
districts.202  The law also would have allowed students from unaccredited 
public schools to transfer to private, nonsectarian schools.203  Governor Nix-
on vetoed the bill in June 2014 in part because it would allow for public mon-
ey to be used to pay private school tuition and because he did not think it 
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provided answers to the school transfer law problems but would instead cre-
ate new problems.204 
Given the numerous negative ramifications of the transfer law and the 
Supreme Court of Missouri’s decisions in Breitenfeld and Blue Springs R-IV 
School District, it is obvious that the law must be replaced. 
In the meantime, there is a possibility that litigation regarding the con-
stitutionality of the transportation section of the transfer law could be suc-
cessfully challenged by taxpayers as a Hancock violation.  The court in 
Breitenfeld determined that the transportation provided for in the law was a 
new activity under the first prong of the unfunded mandate test to prove a 
Hancock violation.205  However, the court was unable to find a Hancock vio-
lation in Breitenfeld because of the speculative nature of the evidence offered 
to prove the second prong of the unfunded mandate test.206  If a taxpayer 
challenger brought concrete evidence to the table of the costs the transporta-
tion would entail, the court could perhaps find a Hancock violation.  Success-
fully litigating this aspect of the transfer law could provide some relief for the 
unaccredited school districts while legislators draft a bill that will fix the 
problems and will be signed into law by the Governor. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The court in Breitenfeld upheld the school transfer law against a Han-
cock Amendment challenge.207  This holding and the school transfer law have 
numerous unwelcome consequences that do not justify the law’s continuing 
operation as it presently exists.  In Blue Springs R-IV School District, the 
Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed its ruling in Breitenfeld, cementing the 
fact that school districts will not be able to find reprieve from paying tuition 
for transferring students or accepting transfer students into a district that can-
not accommodate them.208  Missouri lawmakers must not only agree on a 
change to the law, but they must also agree on a change that the Governor 
will sign.  Only time will tell what becomes of Section 167.131.  
The transfer law is just a bandage stuck on the overwhelming problem 
of underperforming and unaccredited school districts.  It is a tragedy for Mis-
souri’s students that its legislature and Governor cannot find and agree on a 
solution. By enacting and enforcing the transfer law, unaccredited districts 
have little to no hope of ever becoming accredited again.  Although it is be-
yond the scope of this Note, determining the underlying reasons that explain 
why districts become unaccredited is where the real solution to providing the 
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best possible public education to Missouri’s youth lies; it does not lie under 
the bandage of the transfer law. 
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